R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota (1992) case brief

WWU, PLSC 415

July 11, 2014

CITATION: R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota, 505 U.S. 377 (1992)

LEGAL ISSUE:

Whether R.A.V.’s cross burning exhibition on an African American family’s property is protected by the First Amendment against the St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance

LAW(S):

§  St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance

§  Free Speech Clause, First Amendment

RATIONALE [Justice Scalia]:
 This constitutional question concerns the First Amendments flexibility over “bias-motivated hatred”. St. Paul’s ordinance includes content-based justification to prevent invective expression in the community. Ideally, the First Amendment does protect R.A.V.’s expressive right, but the court never suggests the Free Speech clause should permit nor privilege threatening expression.

Although the exhibition of a burning cross is a form of expressive speech, it insinuates the express form of “fighting words”. The language of the St. Paul Bias-Motivated Ordinance explicitly prohibits viewpoints associated with “invective” language that slanders “race, color, creed, religion and gender”. In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (1942), the court held that free-speech can be banned if “fighting words” incite a breach-of-peace. The St. Paul ordinance adopted the “fighting words” doctrine to constitute forms of expression that “arouses anger, alarm, or resentment in others”. In effect, St. Paul construed a narrowly-tailored ordinance to prohibit “fighting words” that target select individuals “on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender”. 

Despite evidently expressed “fighting words” by R.A.V., it has no relevance in this case. Although St. Paul’s ordinance served a compelling state-interest to protecting citizens from offensive messages, it was facially content-based. The ordinance targeted particular biases/viewpoints (R.A.V.’s expression) that the First Amendment was designed to safeguard. With good civic intention, St. Paul implemented discriminating content-based rationale to bar hateful speech; but coincidentally, St. Paul also engaged discriminatory practices by enforcing this preemptive ordinance. In conclusion, the St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime treads a state’s commitment to First Amendment neutrality.

HOLDING:

Yes, the Free Speech clause of the First Amendment safeguards R.A.V. because the St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance discriminates particular-expressions and viewpoints of specific groups.

CONCURRING OPINION(S): [Justice White, Blackmun, O’Connor, and Stevens]

The court acknowledges that specific forms of expression are not protected by the First Amendment. Child pornography or shouting “fire” in a public space are content-based prohibitions that impact society adversely in evident ways. State-interests prohibiting “fighting words” should avoid overly-broad classifications barring expression. In concurrence, the St. Paul ordinance is unconstitutional because it proactively targeted the particular content R.A.V. expressed despite its consequential breach-of-peace.

Sweatt v. Painter (1950) case brief

WWU, PLSC 415

July 17, 2014

CITATION: Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950)

LEGAL ISSUE:

Whether the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees black students, namely Sweatt, equal educational opportunities granted to white students in Texas universities.

APPLICABLE LAWS:

• Equal Protection Clause, Fourteenth Amendment
• Texas statute barring black college applicants 

RATIONALE: [Chief Justice Vinson]

After the University of Texas Law School acknowledged its discrimination practices, the state administrators “hastily established” an interim law school specifically for black students. A decade earlier, Missouri ex rel Gaines v. Canada (1938) upheld that states must provide equal accommodations and access to all citizens. Texas did not satisfy the Separate but Equal Doctrine by “hastily establishing” an interim law school for black students. Although Texas erected a law school exclusively for black students a year after Sweatt’s discrimination claim, the institutional accommodations offered to black students were clearly disproportional in contrast to the privileges of white students.

The interim law school for black students did not sufficiently accommodate its students. Texas neglected the institution for black students with a lack of facility funding, proper staff, and a minimal library collection. The credentialed curriculum and academic prestige did not match the tier standard of University of Texas Law School for white students. The court reasoned that Texas’ reputable white law school was substantially more superior to Sweatt’s black law school which “lacked accreditation”.

The Supreme Court applied strict-scrutiny assessment towards state-sanctioned racial discrimination. The Fourteenth Amendment safeguards black students from institutional practices that deprive persons on the account of race; Texas infringes Sweatt’s equal access. As a constitutional guarantee, the Equal Protection Clause encompasses all states to promote societal fairness. This judgment holds precedent over other racial state-statutes barring citizens from equal access and accommodations. Chief Justice Vinson posits the irony that legally-minded Texas administrators deliberately used racial classification to stint equal educational opportunities and privileges, also afforded to them

HOLDING:

Yes, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment nullifies Texas’ discriminatory statute which barred Sweatt’s university enrollment on account of race. The Texas Supreme Court’s decision is reversed.